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guishable from the present case. She
observed that the guidelines in
Morales were not in themselves
"law," but invoked generally
applicable consumer fraud statutes
to enforce the NAAG guidelines
relating to rates, routes, or services.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that
consumer fraud statutes not facially
related to airlines were preempted in
Morales because the subject matter
of the action related to airline rates.
Similarly, the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act at issue in this case also

should be preempted because the
subject matter of the contract the
plaintiffs sought to enforce related to
airline rates and services. According
to Justice O'Connor, Morales is
indistinguishable from the present
case, and therefore both the plaintiffs' breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act claims should be
preempted by the ADA. However,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that
personal injury claims against
airlines are not always preempted
under her view of Morales. She

distinguished many personal injury
claims as not relating to airline
services, but rather relating to safety.
In summary, although the
dissenters took opposite positions on
ADA preemption, the majority of
the Court followed the middle
ground, barring the plaintiffs' claims
against American Airlines based on
state consumer fraud statutes, but
allowing them to seek enforcement
of contract terms agreed to by the
airline.

Coors wins battle over beer labels
by Russell Collins
Beer drinkers may now know exactly how
much alcohol is in their drink of choice. The United
States Supreme Court recently struck a federal ban on
labeling beer with its alcohol content in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Company, 115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995).
Since 1935, the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act ("FAAA") has banned the disclosure of beer alcohol
content on labels. The post-prohibition statute established federal rules governing the distribution, production and importation of alcohol; and created the Federal
Alcohol Administration. The FAAA empowered the
Secretary of the Treasury to regulate alcohol packaging
through § 205(e)(2), which then delegated the power to
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF').
The ATF then enacted 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a), which
prohibited the disclosure of alcohol content on labels
and in advertisements in states that did not have legislation mandating its inclusion on beer labels.
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ATF rejects proposed Coors label
In 1987, the ATF rejected Coors' proposed beer
label design and advertising campaign pursuant to its
regulations. Both the label and ad campaign disclosed
the alcohol content of Coors beer. Coors responded by
filing suit in Colorado District Court against the Secretary of the Treasury. The court granted injunctive relief
barring enforcement of the alcohol content disclosure
ban, but the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded,
emphasizing the government's substantial interest in
suppressing alcohol "strength wars."
On remand, the district court again invalidated
the label ban; however, it upheld the prohibition against
using the alcohol content of beer in advertising. Although the government requested review of the label ban
nullification, Coors did not challenge the legitimacy of
the advertising restriction. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the later district court decision nullifying the label
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restriction, reasoning that it violated the First Amendment by failing to advance a governmental interest in a
direct and material way. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Commercial speech guidelines govern
Initially, the Supreme Court classified beer
labels as commercial speech and structured its analysis
to fit that classification. The Court applied the two part
test for constitutional validity articulated in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y, 447 U.S. 557 (1978). For a commercial speech
regulation to survive a First Amendment challenge, it
must meet two requirements: 1) the regulation must be
related to lawful activity; and 2) must assert a substantial
governmental interest. Additionally, the regulation must
directly advance the government's asserted interest and
may not be broader than necessary.
The government alleged the ban advanced its
substantial interest in limiting "strength wars" by
preventing brewers from distinguishing their beer on the
basis of alcohol content and by inhibiting consumers
from choosing beers based on percentage of alcohol.
Alternatively, the government maintained the labeling
ban simplified state efforts to regulate alcohol, since the
ban only applied to states without their own beer label
legislation. The government argued this limited application prevented states from having to pass their own
legislation.
Coors responded that the FAAA was not
originally passed to suppress strength wars, but to
prevent inaccurate claims of alcohol content. Coors
stressed it merely wished to disclose truthful and
verifiable information on its labels. Further, Coors
argued that the label regulation did not aim to suppress
strength wars because the same statute actually mandated producers of wine and distilled spirits to print
alcohol content on their labels.
The Court acknowledged the government's
interest in suppressing strength wars as "substantial"
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under the test from Central Hudson and recognized a
further concern in promoting the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens through alcohol regulation. However,
the Court accepted Coors' interpretation that the purpose
of the statute was unrelated to the suppression of
strength wars. The Court also rejected the government's
argument that the ban facilitated state alcohol regulation.

Ban fails to advance government's interest
Under the Central Hudson test, a valid restriction on commercial speech must also directly advance
the governmental interest and not be broader than
necessary. The Court relied on a previous articulation of
this standard that held the government must demonstrate
how the regulation advances its interest in a "direct and
material way."
The government argued that it met this burden
by alleging that beer producers are already waging a
"strength war" in the "malt liquor" market (malt liquor
has a higher alcohol content than regular beer). The
government maintained "common sense" indicates that a
ban on disclosure will prevent consumers from choosing
beer on the basis of alcohol content. To support its
contention, the government pointed to the suppression of
a strength war in the 1930s caused by the label ban.
Further, the government claimed that Coors challenged
the label regulation in order to change the consumer
perception that its beer contains less alcohol than other
brands.
In response, Coors argued the regulation is
broader than necessary and internally inconsistent.
While this regulation prevents disclosure for beer, other
regulations mandate disclosure for distilled spirits and
wine with an alcohol content greater than 14 percent.
Coors argued that this distinction and the ability to
distinguish high alcohol beer through the use of "malt
liquor" destroys any benefit of the disclosure ban.
The Court rejected the government's position
and accepted Coors' argument that the regulation does
not further the government's interest in suppressing
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strength wars. The Court acknowledged the "overall
irrationality" of the current label regulation in light of
the more effective, and unchallenged, advertising
regulation. The Court found Coors' argument persuasive, which focused on the different treatment of alcohol
disclosure in malt liquor.
As the Court recognized, even though the
regulation advanced the state's interest in a "direct and
material way," it failed the First Amendment test that
required a "fit" between the regulation and its articulated
goals. Alternatives exist which accomplish the
government's goals more effectively. For example,
Coors suggested directly limiting the alcohol content of
beer or limiting the ban to "malt liquor." The Court
recognized that the label ban was too broad and concluded that it violated the First Amendment's protections
of commercial speech. Therefore, the Court invalidated
the label ban and affirmed the Tenth Circuit's opinion.

Justice Stevens disagrees with analysis
Justice Stevens, concurring, disagreed that beer
labels qualify as commercial speech because the label

regulation does not prevent misleading speech or protect
consumers from incomplete information - the essential
reasons for regulating commercial speech.
Justice Stevens based his position on Coors'
desire to disclose truthful, accurate information about
the alcohol content of its beer. Justice Stevens argued
that the majority failed to articulate why the lower
protection standards afforded commercial speech should
apply to beer labels. In any other context, truthful
statements about alcohol content would receive full First
Amendment protection. Justice Stevens reasoned that
commercial speech guidelines should be limited to
speech that may mislead consumers. Here, Coors merely
wished to present "truthful, unadorned, informative
speech." Therefore, Justice Stevens argued the higher
protections given to speech under general First Amendment guidelines should have applied to nullify the label
ban.
Nevertheless, the majority's position that
commercial speech guidelines govern led to the invalidation of the federal label ban on alcohol content
disclosure on beer labels in those states that do not
mandate it themselves.

Texas Supreme Court denies homeowners' implied
warranty and unconscionability claims under
state's Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act
by Raquel Villanueva
In Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434
(Tex. 1994), the Supreme Court of Texas held that
homeowners suing their developer under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA") had no cause of action based upon either an
implied warranty or unconscionability theory. The court
further held that the lower court's judgment allowing the
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homeowners to recover both the cost of repairs and the
diminution in value of the home improperly granted
them double recovery and ruled that the homeowners
failed to evidence compensable mental anguish. Therefore, the court modified the judgment by denying double
recovery and damages for DPTA claims and attorneys'
fees.
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